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Introduction: Prospects at the Latest Fin-de-sie`cle
If there were ever a time when the Enlightenment’s emancipatory promise for a life of
individual autonomy and experimental self-realization seemed close to fulfillment, it was the
decade of the 1990s in advanced industrial democracies. This was not just the most prosperous
decade in recorded history, measured in terms of economic growth.1 The “roaring 1990s”
have also been celebrated for the unprecedented breakdown of institutional and occupational
hierarchies, as the new knowledge-based economy increased professional heterogeneity and
unleashed a cornucopia of earning opportunities, thus allowing unprecedented flexibility
of lifestyles and increased personal chances and choices over a lifetime.2 The 1990s have
been extolled for the proliferation of forms of ownership and tenure that led to the diffusion
of class; for the rise of participatory and deliberative forms of democratic politics; for the
growth of post-materialism, as political engagement with issues of identity, lifestyle and
the environment came to trump the standard “bread-and-butter” economic concerns with
productivity and redistribution. Being the apex of neo-liberal capitalism, the 1990s of course
carried all the marks of the epoch’s ambivalence – from the astounding increase of wealth
to its conspicuously unequal distribution and the rising ecological costs of growth. I am,
nevertheless, referring here to a strand of critique that emerged from the Left – a critique that
defamed the old centralized Fabian model of welfare governance for its alienating tendencies
and commended the reformed welfare state of the late twentieth century for re-empowering
citizens.3 In this vein, proponents of the individualization theory of advanced modernity (such
as Anthony Giddens, Zygmunt Bauman and Ulrich Beck) have praised what they saw as the
rise of individual agency in the constitution of life situations. In their accounts, institutional
liberalization and depoliticization of production in the framework of the reformed welfare
state of the late twentieth century allowed for the expansion of human autonomy and choice.4
These analyses resonate with Marcuse’s forecast, advanced four decades earlier, for ending
alienated labor by means of rational mastery of advanced technology, thereby completely
merging work and play, productive and creative work, in our daily lives.5 Homo Faber and
Zoon Politicon appeared to be not just making a place for Homo Ludens, but even to be
befriending him.
The past fin-de-sie`cle conjuncture seemed effectively to contain a particularly strong de-
commodifying potential (i.e. possibilities to exit the labor market with little or no loss of
income).6 As the facility and speed of wealth creation that the knowledge economy enabled
was combined with flexibility of employment and diversification of sources of income,
an effective possibility emerged to loosen the link between the productive capacity of our
societies and the dependency of needs’ satisfaction on an individual’s engagement with the
process of material production. To the extent that the structural constrains of capitalism
allowed, it seemed that, for a moment, the lifeworld was not only gaining autonomy from the
systems of economic production and political administration,7 but was even mobilizing them
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to its advantage.8 Thus, the peculiar context of the 1990s appeared to have combined the best
features of the three consecutive models of capitalism: the entrepreneurial autonomy of 19th
century liberal capitalism, the economic security of state-managed capitalism (the post-war
welfare state), and the prosperity produced under the neo-liberal form that dominated the
last two decades of the 20th century.
The spectacular emancipatory opening of the 1990s is speedily closing while, as I will
argue in what follows, neo-liberal capitalism is transforming into a new model, marked by
changes in the structures of the political economy and political competition that, combined,
induce the deepened commodification of labor. While only two decades ago prognoses of the
coming of the leisure society in the post-industrial West occupied the public imagination,9
there is overwhelming evidence that, despite the new material opportunities for voluntary
exit from the labor market that the new economy contains, we are actually working more,
and longer.10 (To the extent that work-related anxiety disorders are a psychological symptom
of alienation, the sharp increase of work-related depression in recent years11 would have
fascinated Adorno and Horkheimer.) This tension between the unprecedented possibilities
for exit from the labor market and rapidly increasing labor commodification constitutes one
of the paradoxes in terms of which Martin Hartman and Axel Honneth have suggested, in
this journal, to conceptualize contemporary capitalism.12
In the analysis that follows, I pay particular attention to the closure, within the span of
the first decade of this century, of the de-commodification policy perspective in advanced
industrial democracies. The post-war welfare state, in its national variations and cross-
national modalities,13 has been marked by the co-existence of two normative imperatives and,
related to them, policy trajectories. The first places an emphasis on labor de-commodification,
defined as exit from the labor market with little or no loss of income. From the legal limitation
of working hours, to various instruments for income maintenance (especially means-tested
benefits not predicated on employment), state-monitored social security allowed for the
(relative) decoupling of the productivist logic of markets and the valorization of human
life. This trajectory in the existence of the welfare state I will call the “emancipation”
perspective. On the other hand is the imperative of high labor force participation, which
valorizes and pursues labor’s engagement with production. I will call this policy trajectory
the “commodification” perspective. It is the success of the decomodification agenda, and
the shift it enabled from issues of economic security to those of identity and lifestyle, that
opened the cognitive space for the “recognition” agenda in justice debates in the 1980s, both
in Europe and the U.S. The current erosion of the decommodification perspective in social
provision is thus likely to have adverse effect on the recognition agenda. (To evoke Nancy
Fraser, no recognition without redistribution, indeed.14)
A systematic shift from state-centered to market-centered social provision has been taking
place over the past twenty years, across the various models of “welfare capitalism” – a
transition from “welfare” to “workfare,” i.e the conditioning of social provision on labor-
market participation.15 Governments belonging to both main political families of the Left and
the Right have undertaken such reforms.16 This revision of the welfare state (in the direction
of the so called “Third Way”) has meant a shift in the balance between the emancipatory and
the commodification trajectories in favor of the latter and a closure of the opportunity for
de-commodification that the new economy had briefly created at the close of the last century.
I propose to explore the causes of this closure within a hypothesis about the emergence
of “reorganized” capitalism as consecutively the fourth model of capitalism – after the 19th
century entrepreneurial form, the post-liberal “organized” capitalism of the welfare state,
and the “disorganized” neo-liberal model of the late 20th century. I attribute the waning
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of the decommodification perspective in social provision to peculiarities of the new model
of capitalism concerning (1) the key dynamics of social stratification, (2) the matrix of
state-society relations, and (3) the structure of electoral mobilization of advanced industrial
democracies. I consider the emergence of this new model of capitalism as preceding the
global economic meltdown of 2008–2009 and therefore not triggered by it. First, I will
argue that recent changes in the structure of the political economy of advanced industrial
democracies turns the productive capacity of these societies into an imperative to work even
when de-commodification options are politically available. This results from the emergence
of a new structural cleavage around institutionalized exposure to the opportunities and risks
of globalization. Second, this new structural cleavage brings about a new pattern of state-
society relations (what I will describe as the “daddy state”), which affects the nature of
political mobilization and fosters the valorization of labor commodification into a normative
standard of justice, leading to the fetishization of productive capacity per se. Third, I will
argue that changes in the structure of political competition preclude the formation of alliances
of social forces supporting de-commodification policies. The new structural cleavage runs
across, rather than along, the capital-labor dynamics of conflict and relates to the left–right
ideological axis. This is splitting the Left and placing its typical constituencies in opposition
to each other. As a result, I will argue, the alliance of social forces that had supported policies
of labor decommodification throughout the 20th century is eroding, which effectively brings
about the demise of the emancipatory trajectory of the 1990s, thus making way for a new
form of institutionalized redistribution of resources from labor to capital typical of the new
model of capitalism.
Before addressing these three hypotheses in the second part of this paper, I will, in its first
part, review relevant elements in the evolution of the structure of the political economy and the
structure of political competition in advanced industrial democracies in the twentieth century
in order to set up the background of the current emergence of “re-organized” capitalism as a
sequentially fourth constellation of institutionalized state-society relations within the lifespan
of capitalism.17
1. Political Economy and Political Mobilization in the 20th Century
a) From Liberal to Administered Capitalism
Nineteenth-century entrepreneurial capitalism had combined institutional autonomy for the
individual with economic constraints to that autonomy known as labor commodification.
The “administered” or “monopoly” capitalism that emerged in the 1930s and consolidated
in different forms of welfare states after World War II was marked by the subordination
of profitability to growth as a key economic imperative. The policy debate thus began to
revolve around economic growth, market regulation, and social transfer systems. Already
in their early analyses of the transition from the 19th century entrepreneurial capitalism
to the “administered” societies of corporate capitalism,18 the founders of the Frankfurt
School lamented the loss of individuality and autonomy that this transformation entailed.
The shift from entrepreneurial capitalism to the post-liberal model meant a rationalization
of capital mediated by the state, a process in which the institutional management of the
economy incurred the increasing extension of collective capital over every facet of life and
thus, the negation of liberalism. The politicization of economic production, together with
the development of the culture industry (as it incurs the colonization of consciousness),
destroyed the spaces of individual autonomy that had been available under entrepreneurial
C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Social Justice after Neo-liberalism: Albena Azmanova 393
capitalism.19 Within the lifetime of welfare capitalism, these losses to individual agency
were only partially compensated for (but not offset) by the policies of decommodification –
since gains in autonomy from the market have been contingent upon the strong institutional
agency of the state. Yet labor decommodification – or the reduced dependence on the market
for needs satisfaction, had been the single most formidable achievement of that period.
The rise of post-materialism is testimony to the social achievement of this period. In
the analysis of Ronald Ingleheart, based on the World Values Survey, socialization in the
conditions of economic affluence and security in the framework of the post-war welfare
state has led people to embrace post-material values linked to self-expression, freedom, and
quality of life. This resulted in the shift, since the 1970s, from class-based to quality-of-life
politics; from the “old politics” of bread-and-butter concerns (such as income and housing)
to “new politics” centered on lifestyle, self-expression, citizen democracy, identity rights and
concerns with the environment.20
The map of political contestation that was established in the lifetime of entrepreneurial
capitalism around a fundamental capital–labor relationship remained valid throughout the
lifespan of post-liberal (welfare) capitalism, structuring ideological orientation and electoral
competition around a left-right axis.21 Let us briefly recall this map in order to clarify the
relevant, for this analysis, relationship between the structure of political competition and that
of the political economy (Chart 1).
Ideological competition within the advanced capitalist democracies of the twentieth cen-
tury has been broadly structured along two axes – an economic one, stretching between free
market (capitalist) and regulated market (socialist) poles; and a cultural one, opposing liber-
tarian to authoritarian values. While ideological positions are structured around (at least) two
dimensions – the aggregation of citizens’ policy preferences, on the one hand, and the polit-
ical competition among parties, on the other – take place along a single, usually “left–right,”
dimension. On the level of “political demand” (by society), this axis aggregates the diverse
positions into contrasting policy stances (i.e. in favor or against state regulation of the econ-
omy; in favor or against gender equality). On the level of “political supply” (by parties and
governments), this axis serves to articulate eligible policy options. It is along this dimension
that the formation of societal alliances (among socially diverse publics), and the building of
political coalitions (e.g. coalitions of parties – in government as in opposition) take place.
The rise of the New Left in the 1960s altered the content, but not the structure, of political
competition along a left-right axis of alignment. The productivist consensus on the welfare
state (on issues of production and redistribution) was further enriched by themes of identity
politics (valorization of difference) and global ecological concerns. Thus, a strong non-
productivist dimension was added to the post-war social model. At the same time, a tension
within the Left emerged between the “old” productivist concerns with growth, employment
and social transfer systems and the “new” post-material values and ecological concerns which
are anti-productivist in nature. However, the New Left only added an element to the old
political spectrum (based on the distribution of a new good – identity recognition), without
disturbing the left-right axis of political competition, as these formations usually aligned
with the “old” Left in reference to social policies targeting decommodification, global social
solidarity, and cultural liberalism. In the context of the post-industrial societies of the 1970s
and 1980s, collective preferences therefore began to be distributed diagonally, clustered in
a “left libertarian” and “right authoritarian” corners, or in what I will refer to hereafter as
Northwest-Southeast orientation.22 It was the overlapping consensus on decommodification
(of labor and nature) that became the common denominator uniting the old and the new Left,
positioning the Left firmly in the North-West sector of the map of political competition. This
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Chart 1: Political Map of the 20th Century
aggregation of societal alliances around what I named the “emancipatory” perspective in
social provision (more strongly so in Europe than in the United States) secured the political
mobilization for strong policies of wealth-redistribution and labor-market exit. As I will
argue in the next section of this analysis, the currently emerging new structural cleavage
is gradually undermining this alliance, positioning the constituencies of the “old” and the
“new” Left at opposite poles in the axis of political mobilization.
b) From “Administered” to “Disorganized” Capitalism
The neo-liberal structural transformation that issued in the 1970s coincided with the growth
of information technology and the transition to post-industrial societies in the late twentieth
century. As is by now well-documented, the post-industrial knowledge economy of open
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borders has triggered an acute transformation in work and lifestyle patterns in Western
societies.23 This constellation is marked by fragmentation at the level of political economy –
both in occupational structures and institutional frameworks, inviting the label “disorganized
capitalism” (Offe), in contrast to the preceding model.24
Contrary to the early Frankfurt School’s skepticism about the possibility of reviving liberal
capitalism, optimistic accounts emerged, especially in the 1990s, stressing the liberating
potential found in what Zygmunt Bauman has called “liquid” modernity. According to such
accounts, institutional liberalization and depolitization of production in the late twentieth
century have freed individual agency from both the institutional constraints of bureaucratic
capitalism and the old determinations of class, creating a condition in which “individuals
must produce, stage, and cobble together their biographies themselves.”25 And so enters the
“portfolio person” (John Gray) – a person without permanent attachment to any particular
occupation or organization, able to enter and exit the labor market at will.26
The fragmentation at the level of political economy (in terms of occupational structures
and institutional frameworks) typical of neo-liberal, “disorganized” capitalism is paralleled
by a fragmentation of the structure of political mobilization, inviting diagnoses of the end of
the left-right divide. As Russell Hardin has observed, increased social mobility, occupational
heterogeneity, decline of collective identities, fragmentation of group demands into par-
ticular but unrelated issues, policy convergence between parties, increased complexity and
specialization of policy-making all ultimately “preclude the organization of politics along a
single left-right economic dimension.”27 Furthermore, Peter Mair has argued that, while the
left–right continuum has effectively lost its capacity to make overall sense of mainstream
politics, it is not being replaced by an alternative overarching paradigm.28
Let me now turn to the exit from the third, neo-liberal, model (disorganized capitalism)
and address the recent reorganization of capitalism into its fourth modality.
2. Reorganized Capitalism
We noted that the third sequential model of capitalism – i.e. the neo-liberal, “disorganized,”
capitalism – had been marked by economic, institutional, and political fragmentation and
pluralization. A “re-organized” model is currently emerging, as the economic and social
production of risks by the knowledge economy of open borders (in shorthand – globalization)
has very recently triggered a shift in the structural conditions that define postindustrial
societies.
Restructuring takes place both on the level of political economy (both in terms of dynamics
of social stratification and in terms of the matrix of state-society relations) and on the level
of political mobilization. I will address these sets of processes in turn and examine their
combined causal impact for deepening commodification.
a) Changes in the Dynamics of Stratification
While in a (idealized) market society risks and opportunities are evenly mixed for every
participant, the two have become disentangled and even polarized. Indeed, in contrast to
the individualization thesis discussed earlier, a plethora of recent studies have observed the
emergence of “losers” (a new “pracariat”) and “winners” from globalization in advanced
industrial democracies. What are the key dynamics of restructuring?
Increased competition in the context of global economic integration has incurred the
reversal in economic priorities: profitability, rather than growth, has again become the key
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economic imperative, just as had been the case in the enterpreneurial model of capitalism. To
the extent that profitability is now strongly conditioned on access to the knowledge economy
of open borders, this has altered the systemic dynamics of social stratification. The key
dynamics of stratification now start to be linked to the social impact of the exposure to the risks
and opportunities immanent in the knowledge economy of open borders. As I have established
in previously published research, the polarization of life chances in the new context is no
longer determined by class position (labor vs. capital), but by institutionalized access to
security and opportunity.29 The most powerful factor for social stratification becomes the
capacity for voluntary entry into, and secure exit from, the labor market. This translates into
a personalized capacity for decommodification conditioned on the type of professional skills
(those securing access to the new economy) and institutionally enabled by the regulative
framework of individualization that I will discuss below.
By increasing the opportunities for, and the speed of, market entry and exit, globalization
indeed diminishes social closure,30 diffuses class stratification, and fosters individualization.
However, within this process, the very access to earning opportunities is stratified. Exposure
to risk is stratified along globalization’s two main vectors – a quantitative one linked to
global economic integration in the context of open borders, and a qualitative one linked to
information technology and its effects on professional occupation. Importantly, these two
vectors of globalization are causing varied types of distribution of opportunities and hazards
within capital and labor (but between economic sectors), rather than between social groups
(such as capital and labor) within economic sectors. Note, for instance, that the biggest
increase in wealth within the past decade has not been based on ownership of productive
capital, but instead on the mastery of new technology in economies of scale. Opportunities
have until very recently increased among those whose fortunes are tied to the “new econ-
omy” – cutting-edge, global businesses such as financial services, media and information
technologies.31 The main factor is not ownership of productive capital, but occupational
links to the new economy, which provides for both mobility and scale, thus accumulating the
temporal (speed) and geographical (scope) factors in wealth-creation. The massive bail-out
of financial capital over the course of 2008 is another confirmation of the uneven distribution
of opportunities and risks: both opportunity and institutionalized security belong to spheres
of economic activity characterized by their systemic exposure to the global economy.
It is, thus, the occupational location in the axis new-old economy that sets the logic of social
stratification beyond a simple dichotomy of capital versus labor, or skilled versus unskilled
labor. The distribution of opportunities and hazards is not only unequal, it does not even
follow the simple logic of a growing wealth gap: over the past decade, wealth stagnation has
become intertwined with insecurity for workers in the middle of the economy, while those at
the top have become even richer and many poor workers have increased their wealth share.32
b) Changes in Institutionalized State-Society Relations
What is the new matrix of state-society relations? During the third, neo-liberal stage, that
matrix had been what Giandomenico Majone described as “the regulatory state” – a state
that gave priority to the use of legal authority and regulation over other tools of stabilization
and redistribution.33 A peculiarity of this style of regulation is that it is individual-based. It
entailed individual responsibilization, creating a framework in which individuals are not so
much free, as “forced to take charge of their own life.”34 Thus, the Nanny state of welfare
capitalism was replaced by the Stepmother state of the neo-liberal 1980s and 1990s – a state
that used legal authority to enforce individual self-reliance.
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Although initially prompting individualization (and thus promising some degree of eman-
cipation), this particular institutional logic of state-society relations has ultimately enhanced
the structural imperative to commodification, and universalized it, due to the interplay of
two factors:
First, since the turn of the century, economic insecurity, linked to globalization, has
risen (from prospects for job outsourcing to the systemic financial risk endemic to complex
financial engineering). Second, the class relationship may not have disappeared, but it has
become diffused, thus turning the risks of globalization into nebulous threats. In contexts
of high economic uncertainly, workers are equally threatened by loss of jobs as by the
likelihood of the stock market funds in which their pension contributions are invested,
to become insolvent. As sources of income (from wages to ownership of equity shares)
have become both diversified and integrated, opportunities for wealth-creation and income
insecurity have simultaneously increased. As a result, the opportunities for voluntary exit
from the labor market, even when available, are not being used. The opportunity for paid
employment is becoming an imperative for work. Survey data constantly indicate that those
who have the flexibity to work less, do not.35
With the rise of economic insecurity in the new century a counter-movement to institutional
individualization has been emerging as citizens begin to address the state with demands for
institutionally generated provisions of security and opportunity in terms of exposure to, and
protection from, globalization. The Nanny state of organized capitalism, and the Stepmother
state of neo-liberalism have thus made way for what could be called the Daddy state of
reorganized capitalism. This state intervenes on two accounts:
First, rather than engaging with social transfer systems, the state enhances the provision
of general public services. Public spending had not diminished in the neo-liberal phase. On
the contrary, there had been a positive correlation between international trade exposure and
the size of the public sector.36 This tendency, already available under neo-liberal capitalism,
has become a systemic feature of the re-organized model. As the state, allegedly, is unable
to counter the domestic effect of global economic volatility, public demands emerge for
compensation not so much through redistribution but via increased spending on public
services.
Second, through redistributive and regulatory policies, the Daddy state intervenes to
provide institutional support to business37 rather than to labor. The unprecedented, extremely
generous and speedy financial rescue of the credit market in the US and Europe in 2008 are
an illustration of this shift in the nature of state intervention. In a short-term perspective,
these policy measures amount to a large transfer of resources from lower to higher income
earners. In the longer term, they hamper the standard redistributive functions of the state as
the cost of the financial rescue is born by national budgets.
As a result of these changes in the structure of the political economy of advanced industrial
democracies a new, more generalized type of labor commodification has established itself. In
a context in which the proliferation of economic opportunities is accompanied by generalized
income insecurity (despite economic growth) and institutionalized enforcement of economic
self-reliance, the entrepreneurial opportunities turn into an obligation for economic enterprise
(which is valid equally for labor and for the owners/managers of capital).
Thus, a normative adjustment is taking place as a strongly positive valorization of labor
commodification emerges within the articulation of claims to social justice. As I noted,
state-society relations are now structured by demands for provision of security and exposure
to opportunity. However, political mobilization in the context marked by a high degree of
insecurity over sources of income (rather than simply employment uncertainty) triggers
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demands for labor-market participation as a matter of social justice. Employment is the
common denominator where quests for opportunity and quests for security meet. The two
purported goals of social democracy – decommodification and labor-market participation
have always been in tension. However, under the threat of job dislocation in the context
of global economic competition, labor-market participation wins the upper hand. It is even
presented as a leading concern of social justice. It is significant, for instance, that one of the
most celebrated de-commodification policies in recent years – the reduction of the working
week to 35 hours in France, introduced in 2000 – aimed primarily at new job creation. The key
justification for relaxing the law, since 2007, has been its failure to create employment. For the
past decade, workers are accepting longer working hours, flexible employment options with
poor social security coverage, as well as lower pay for the sake of job (income) preservation.
In the new constellation, the state’s redistributive policies target not income-generation, but
employment-generation. Thus, the primary addressee of these policies are employers, rather
than labor.
c) Changes in the Structure of Political Competition
Finally, how is the structure of political competition disabling the policy agenda of decom-
modification? As a result of the new systemic distribution of economic opportunity and
risk, new fault-lines of political conflict and a new structures of political mobilization are
emerging, thus ushering in a new era of electoral politics.38 I will first review key changes
in the content of the policy agenda that grounds political competition, before addressing the
emerging structure of political contestation.
As a result of the above-reviewed changes in the structure of the political economy and
in the nature of state-society relations, a new public agenda is emerging – one centered on
material (economic and political) risk linked to insecurity of income and physical unsafety
in the context of globalization. What we could refer to as the new order-and–safety agenda
has four constitutive elements: physical security, political order, cultural estrangement, and
income insecurity, as the economic component of the mix. Significantly, the recent resurgence
of economic issues in political campaigning does not amount to a revival of the growth-and-
employment agenda of the welfare state consensus. While the old paradigm is concerned with
employment in terms of overall growth and efficiency, the new one refers to unemployment
in terms of fear, loss, and marginalization. By combining economic and physical safety, this
agenda integrates the classic (for the late twentieth-century paradigm) ideological oppositions
between social justice (on the left) and law-and-order (on the right).
The rise of the new order-and-safety agenda presents a particular challenge for the Left,
as this agenda is opting out to replace both the productivist agenda (of employment and
redistribution) that had unified the traditional Left, as well as the post-materialist “new
politics” that had mobilized the New Left (libertarian and ecological parties and movements).
Note that in national elections, Left incumbents in Europe’s established democracies have
been persistently voted out of power, since the turn of the century, despite being often at the
height of their economic performance.39 These electoral misfortunes of social democracy
could be traced to the incapacity of the Left to adjust to the new public demands. In contrast
to right-wing parties, the centre-left cannot easily reconcile its heritage of cultural liberalism
and transnational social solidarity to the new order-and-safety agenda. Political formations
of the New Left have also been negatively affected. It is the eclipsing of the post-materialist
agenda of the late twentieth century by the security-and-safety framework of the early
twenty-first century that is among the main causes of the drop in electoral support for some
C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Social Justice after Neo-liberalism: Albena Azmanova 399
Green parties, as a part of the traditional social constituencies of the Greens (upper-middle
class professionals) gives preference to countering economic risk over pursuing non-material
goals. Symptomatic of this return to materialism at the turn of the century is the growth in
mortgage (including sub-prime) lending, as well as the entering of housing issues (a typical
bread-and-butter concern) at the center of political debate.
How does the structure of political contestation reflect the described shifts in the content
of the public agenda? As I already noted, the new axial principle in conflict articulation is
the distribution of globalization’s risks as opportunities or hazards. Political mobilization
is thus being shaped by conflicting demands for institutionalized provision of security and
opportunity. This is altering the content of the economic and cultural vectors of ideological
orientation, as well as the axis of political competition.
Within the general cognitive framework centered on economic and physical risk, changes
are occurring in both the economic (horizontal) and cultural (vertical) axes of ideological
orientation (see Chart 2):
i) The economic (horizontal) axis:
In the context of the second half of the twentieth century, the ideological contention be-
tween the Left and the Right was formed around the “free market versus regulated market”
dilemma (and thus, the growth-redistribution poles). At the turn of the century, the focus on
competitiveness places an emphasis on productivity, rather than overall growth. Further, the
stress on competitiveness absorbs (mainstream) economic liberalism, taking it out of the key
ideological debates. The growth – redistribution dialectics of the late twentieth century are
currently being recast as labor-market flexibility and market openness (opportunity attitude
to globalization) versus employment security and externally closed domestic markets (risk
attitude to globalization).
As the productivist logic of the welfare state is being replaced by the imperative of com-
petitiveness in the global economy, the “free-market” and “regulated market” (or socialist–
capitalist) vectors are transformed into “closed economy” and “open economy” vectors.
Thus, although economic liberalism is absorbed (thus, the registered reduction of ideological
competition on this point), the “market openness” versus “market closure” vectors form new
poles of ideological competition along the economic axis.
ii) The cultural (vertical) axis:
Equally significant is the redefinition of the cultural (vertical) axis of ideological orientation.
While in the old paradigm the poles were formed on a libertarian-traditionalist axis, the
recent trans-ideological orientation towards (and mainstreaming of) the order and safety
agenda has meant that the ideological differences of cultural nature are formed around
“cosmopolitan” (open) versus “sovereigntist” (closed) poles, neither of which are averse to
public preferences for order and safety. As the securitization of cultural discourse has created a
consensus on order-and-safety (and caused the marginalization of the libertarian alternative),
the “libertarian” versus “authoritarian” vectors are thus converting into “cosmopolitan”
versus “sovereigntist” ones.
iii) The axis of political competition
Prompted by the new axis of social conflict (in terms of institutionalized exposure to
globalization-incurred risk), an opportunity–adversity cleavage in political mobilization is
emerging, shaped by attitudes to globalization.
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Chart 2: Political Map of the 21st Century
One of the manifestations of the changed patterning of public demands is the convergence
of the ideological preferences of typical electoral constituencies of the Left and the Right.
Thus, recent surveys have established that the numerically most important, and electorally
most active, constituency of the Left in France is the “liberal–authoritarian” one (replacing
the socialist-libertarian one) – i.e. salaried workers in the private sector who believe that
their social situation is worsening and who endorse order and security as well as economic
liberalism.40
Signs of the transition from “left–right” to “opportunity–risk” cleavages abound in the
campaigning of parties. Tellingly, discourses about national sovereignty, political order, the
threat of cultural estrangement (typical of the ideological right), and discourses about social
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justice (common in the ideological terrain of the left) have merged into a new sanctification
of the social potency and cultural supremacy of the nation-state. This double (political and
social) sovereigntist impulse mobilized the particular rejection of the Constitutional Treaty
for Europe in France and the Netherlands in the Spring of 2005 by powerful constituencies
on the Left and the Right. The old left and right ideological extremes have thus come to
overlap on two policy lines: first, in their protectionist reaction to economic and social risk.
The far right is beginning to abandon its economic liberalist stance and is embracing social
protectionism. With this, a major policy differentiation between the radical left and the far
right is lost. Secondly, the old left and right extremes have come to converge on the basis of
their increasing preference for national, at the expense of international, solidarity.
Most significantly, as the opportunity–adversity cleavage I have described cuts, in a sys-
tematic way, across the capital-labor logic of conflict articulation, it is able to split the
left–right poles of orientation and aggregate them into new ones. Thus, a new alliance of
social forces is being formed around an “adversity” pole of mobilization, where parts of
capital and labor align behind policies of economic patriotism – a combination of market
liberalization and a closed (protected) economy, as well as cultural sovereigntism (anti-
immigrant sentiment). At the opposite pole is a cluster of public preferences and party
positions that combines a stress on safety and authority (inherited from the traditional polit-
ical right) and an emphasis on economic liberalism, employment flexibility, open borders,
technological innovation, cultural cosmopolitanism and transnational justice. Ultimately,
the left–right axis of political mobilization, typical of the twentieth century, is transform-
ing into the opportunity–risk axis that will structure conflicts in the twenty-first century
(see Chart 2).
3. Social Justice After the End of the Left–Right Continuum
What are the implications for the social justice agenda in the early 21st century? As I noted, the
axis of political competition is the one along which societal and political alliances are formed.
Every idea is only as strong as the social forces behind it: the idea of decommodification is
losing the alliance of social forces on the left that had previously stood behind it.
On the one hand, the rise of competition as a pivotal theme in the new political agenda has
fostered a stronger alliance between labor and capital – on the basis of a common interest in
increased commodification as a compromise between the imperatives of profitability and job
security. This new alliance between capital and labor has provided the societal support for
the switch (across Europe, and irrespective of governments’ ideological tint) from welfare
to “workfare” (conditioning of welfare benefits on active participation in the labor market),
and has enabled the withdrawal of some of the landmark decommodification policies of
the welfare state (limitation of the working week, generous unemployment and pension
provisions, etc).
On the other hand, the alliance between the social constituencies and political formations
of the “old” and the “new” Left is falling apart. In the context of the late twentieth century, the
political alliance between the “old” and “new” Left was based on two elements – international
social solidarity and shared interest in (anti-productivist) policies of decommodification. Un-
der the impact of globalization, the traditional constituency of the Left (working classes)
is giving priority to economic (national) protectionism over international social solidarity.
At the same time, it is embracing re-commodification policies that save jobs. Thus, the old
affinities of interests that placed the two large, sociologically very different, constituencies
of the Left in the same sector of political alignment no longer hold. In terms of attitudes to
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globalization, they find themselves on opposite sides of the axis of political mobilization.
This will mean that neither of the new poles of political competition is able to elect gov-
ernments enjoying sufficient societal support for a revival of a progressive social agenda
marked by strong labor decommodification policies. The capital–labor coalition in support
of commodification around the “risk” pole (hazards of globalization) is likely to oppose both
the global environmental agenda and the anti-productivist policies that the constituency of
the New Left tends to embrace. Further, the positioning of the constituencies of the New Left
and Green parties around an “opportunity” pole (due to the valorization of clean technology
and global social solidarity) aligns these groups with big capital to which globalization gives
a competitive advantage in wealth-creation.41 While governing coalitions around this pole
might have the leverage to advance the global ecological and development agendas, such
coalitions would not produce sufficient patronage (because of the presence here of big busi-
ness) for the re-enforcement of a social agenda around a strong set of policies of labor-force
decommodification.
Conclusion: Farewell to Homo Ludens
As we have often been reminded since Marx rebuffed utopian socialism, the history of the
Left is a history of the loss and redemption of utopia. In the course of the twentieth century,
the loss of utopia took place by way of reconciliation between socialism and capitalism: on
socio-democratic terms after 1945, and on the terms of neo-liberalism in the late 1980s.42
Nevertheless, the Enlightenment’s promise of a life of individual autonomy and experimental
self-realization, available equally for all, survived as the Left’s political telos and ethical
standard for a just society. The ideal of a life at least relatively free from the productivist
demands of market society (i.e decommodification) persisted as utopia’s last abode, actuated
in the quest for non-material goods linked to identity and lifestyle that came to dominate the
Left’s agenda in the late twentieth century.
The conjunction of changes in the structure of the political economy, and shifts in the
structure of political competition of advanced industrial democracies, that I reviewed in
this analysis, entail the transformation of neo-liberal capitalism and herald, yet again, the
further loss of utopia. As we enter into the model of “reorganized capitalism” the promise
of emancipation, which the turn of the century briefly contained, is dissipating. There is
no room for utopia within the emerging opportunity–risk axis of ideological orientation
that is now challenging the traditional left–right divide. The main ideological lines are now
charted by attitudes, deeply pragmatic in nature, towards the anticipated social impact of the
new economy of open borders and technological innovation – the material gains or threats
of globalization (growth, development, opportunities for employment, and income or their
loss).
While the social question returns in the twenty-first century, it is for the first time that
national social justice agendas are so sharply opposed to international social solidarity:
globalization has placed the two in a zero-sum game. The main constituencies of the Left
thus tend to find themselves on opposite sides of the new redistributive contest: cosmopolitan
concerns with human development versus the justice of national job protection. It had been
the coalition between the old and the new Left that mobilized societal support for strong
redistributive policies – policies allowing exit from the labor market and thus reducing labor
commodification. The splitting of this coalition along the new opportunity–risk political
cleavage bodes badly for any prospects of reviving a progressive social policy agenda centered
on labor decommodification.
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The emerging fourth model of capitalism that I described here as “re-organized capitalism”
is constitutively conditioned on engagement in economic production, even when viable
options for labor market exit are available. Thus, this model is characterized by a generalized
commodification of creative human activity, as work is being fetishized as a perceived
necessity and valorized as a criterion for personal accomplishment and social justice. Hannah
Arendt refers to humanity in this mode as animal laborans. Because the activity of labor is
commanded by perceived necessity, labor, she alleged, is the state of unfreedom. Humanity
as Animal Laborans is now eliminating Homo Faber, Zoon Politicon, and equally regrettably,
it seems to me, Homo Ludens.
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